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ABSTRACT
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) evidence
have become an important evidentiary focus in the courtroom. This type of evidence is
routinely produced as business records under U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence for use in the
emerging discipline of Forensic Cell Site Analysis. The research was undertaken to determine
if evidence produced by operators should be classified as digital evidence and, if so, what
evidence handling methodologies are appropriate to ensure evidence integrity. This research
project resulted in the creation of a method of determining if business records produced
by MNO/MVNO organizations are digital evidence and whether evidentiary integrity is
maintained in the conveyance of evidence between MNO/MVNO records custodians, law
enforcement investigators and attorneys in criminal and civil cases. Block-chain based
Distributed Ledger Technology was examined as a feasible evidence integrity maintenance
solution.
Keywords: Distributed Ledger Technology, DLT, Block-chain, Openchain, Charging Data
Records, Call Data Records, Call Detail Records

1.

INTRODUCTION

A cell phone subscription in the United States
is activated with either a Mobile Network
Operator (MNO) or Mobile Virtual Network
Operator (MVNO), which includes a variety
of business models variously termed Virtual
Network Operator or Mobile Other Licensed
Operator. MNO/MVNO subscriber activity
records, technically defined in 3G standards
as Charging Data Records, are “a formatted
collection of information about a chargeable
event (e.g. time of call set-up, duration of the
c 2019 ADFSL

call, amount of data transferred, etc) for use
in billing and accounting” (ETSI, 2015) and
commonly referred to as Call Detail Records
(CDR), fall into a class of evidence called
digital evidence. This type of evidence has
traditionally been introduced in the courtroom as business records evidence. Citing
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803, exceptions to the rule against hearsay, courts
have, with rare exception, accepted CDRs as
business records evidence. FRE 803 states in
part:
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“The following are not excluded by the rule
against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness:”. . .
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis if:
• (A) the record was made at or near the
time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
• (B) the record was kept in the course
of a regularly conducted activity of a
business, organization, occupation, or
calling, whether or not for profit;
• (C) making the record was a regular
practice of that activity;
• (D) all these conditions are shown by the
testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification
that complies with Rule 902 (11) or (12)
or with a statute permitting certification;
and
• (E) the opponent does not show that the
source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.”
Note that under rule 803, (6), Records of a
Regularly Conducted Activity, MNO/MVNO
produced evidence including Call Detail
Records and other records meet the requirements as business records, if, according to
(6)(E) the opponent does not show that the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. (Federal Rules of Evidence,
2019) This analysis will test the trustworthiness of MNO/MVNO records production as
business records under FRE803(6)(E).
The key questions that this research analysis project seek to answer are: 1) whether
MNO/MNVO records should be recognized
by courts as digital evidence and 2) whether
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the records should be subject to the same fundamental evidence handling standards and
rules as any other digital evidence.
The research for this project is based
upon patented scientific concepts and peer reviewed research as well as standards derived
from the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP), International Organization for Standards (ISO), European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), The 5G
Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP), the
American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) .

1.1

Digital Evidence Test

A four-part test was devised and applied to
MNO/MVNO evidence to determine if this
type of evidence should be subject to digital evidence handling and analysis standards.
The devised test is as follows:
• Is mobile network subscriber communications activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process?
• Are subscriber communications activity
records maintained by MNOs/MVNOs
and extracted for litigation purposes classified as digital evidence?
• Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards?
• Do the same rules for spoliation determination apply to this type of evidence?
When applied to a control group of
MNO/MVNO records produced as evidence
from a pool of 100 civil and criminal cases
the four-part test resulted in a positive determination that this class of evidence is indeed
digital evidence.
This conclusion led to an evidence spoliation analysis of the control group of evidence,
c 2019 ADFSL
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consisting of over 700 evidence items, to determine if any evidence items were tainted
during initial production and postproduction
conveyance between parties.

1.2

Evidence Spoliation/Taint
Analysis

The evidence spoliation analysis consisted of
a multi-part test applied to determine if any
evidence items exhibit positive indications for
spoliation. The test was designed to answer
the following questions:
• Is chain of custody documentation
present for the conveyance from the producing MNO/MVNO to recipient(s)?
• What are the metadata creation and
modification dates of each evidence artifact received?
• Is a modification date present indicating
post creation modification to the evidence artifact?
• What are the metadata creation dates
and authorship of the content of each
evidence artifact?
• Is a modification date present indicating
post creation modification to the evidence artifact and by whom?
• Has all metadata been removed from any
analyzed evidence artifact?
• Is a verification function cryptographic
hash value present for the original
production evidence artifacts (ASTM,
2018)?

2.

BACKGROUND

Mobile Network Operators (MNO)/Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) initiated subscriber activity tracking for
c 2019 ADFSL
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billing purposes when analogue cellular was
launched in 1979. In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued an
order for the Enhanced 911 initiative, augmenting mobile network billing records to include location information. Phase 1 required
that the location of the cell site to which a
subscriber device was registered during communications be documented as part of the
record keeping process.
Multiple technologies are utilized within
mobile networks including radio frequency
isotropic propagation technologies, Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) communications standards-based technologies,
patented communications flow technologies,
and a variety of data recording and gathering technologies. This section will not attempt to reiterate the corpora addressing the
MNO/MVNO technology layers utilized in
what are commonly referred to as 1G, 2G,
3G, 4G and 5G cellular communications but
rather will address the science and methodology more directly applicable to the accounting and billing for subscriber communications
activities of a mobile phone.
CDRs as evidence were made available
from MNO/MVNO in response to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) (1994), Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act (911 Act)
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) (1986) acts. This type of evidence
has become an important evidentiary focus
in the courtroom.
In the late twentieth century, Mobile Network Operators (MNO)/Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) began to produce
subscriber device activity records, otherwise
known as, Call Detail Records (CDR)/Cell
Site Location Information (CSLI) as evidence
in response to subpoena, search warrants and
court orders. The primary focus of the analysis of this type of evidence is two-fold: 1)
analysis of who was communicating with the
Page 61

JDFSL V14N2

subscriber and 2) where the subscriber device
was located during communications.

2.1

Forensic Cell Site Analysis

Forensic cell site analysis is a developing
forensic analysis discipline requiring foundation knowledge of mobile network infrastructure and operations as well as an ability to
analyze and interpret Call Detail Record/Cell Site Location Information (CDR/CSLI)
and other Mobile Network Operator (MNO)
produced evidence. Forensic cell site analysis is a complex field incorporating radio,
atmospheric, photonic, wave propagation,
metrology and computer sciences, and is primarily reliant on human estimations aided
by network testing, basic mapping, spreadsheet and word processing software tools.
Under-developed algorithms embedded in automated tools currently used to process evidence and perform a preliminary analysis
have resulted in a developing analysis capability in its nascent stage. Deficiencies in
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) or errors in algorithms, tools, and processes leads
to incorrect findings, hence the necessity for
standard analysis, validation and error mitigation protocol development. The scientific
disciplines upon which forensic cell site analysis is dependent are often interlaced in complex scenarios due to various factors including:
• MNO infrastructure conditions and utilization loading.
• Cell site to mobile switching core backhaul issues.
• Subscriber and public event crowd behavior.
• Atmospheric events.
• Global network cyber-security events.
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Basic understanding of the following areas of
science should be requisite to every practitioner’s KSAs.

2.2

Radio Science

Radio science is central to forensic cell site
analysis despite the fact that typically less
than 5% of the communications path between
subscriber device and mobile switching core
consists of a radio connection. Radio frequencies in use, communications technologies
utilized, electromagnetic radiation physics,
antenna radiation behaviors and other fundamental radio issues must be considered
during an analysis.

2.3

Atmospheric Science

Atmospheric science impacts the airgap of
mobile network linkage between subscriber
device and cell site. Antenna radiation
pattern and sizing in mobile subscriber devices such as cell phones and mobile network access points (Base Transceiver Station,
NodeB, eNodeB, gNodeB) may be affected
by heightened solar activity, certain precipitation events, lightning strikes or near strikes,
and extremely high winds often affect mobile
network operation and radio signal propagation. Atmospheric impact can reduce, block,
destabilize or skew cell site coverage.

2.4

Photonic Science

Photonic science is the foundation of the
communications transportation infrastructure utilized in the remaining 95% of the
communications path between subscriber device and mobile switching core. Interruption
or congestion in segments of the photonic network used as backhaul between cell sites and
mobile switching core may disrupt or reroute
communications, resulting in intermittent repathing, often manifested as slowdowns or
interruptions in mobile communications that
result in dropped calls, out of sequence communications events, or other anomalies.
c 2019 ADFSL
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2.5

Wave Propagation Science

Wave propagation science has a direct bearing on how radio signals propagate between
subscriber device and cell site. The wave function is a key feature of quantum mechanics
and radio wave scintillations including reflection, diffraction, refraction, absorption and
other scattering of radio signal propagation
at various frequencies, affected by objects in
the path between a subscriber device and
cell site, determine the extent and quality of
cell coverage. Defined as manmade or naturally occurring objects varying in density
and height, morphologies include vegetal, geographic, building or other structures, streets,
waterways, and much more. Morphologies
impact wave propagation and thereby cell site
coverage. Antenna wave propagation behaviors must be considered during an analysis.

2.6

Metrology Science

Metrology, the science of measurement, is
utilized in forensic cell site analysis to elevate
the accuracy of analytical outcomes. An obvious example is the use of time and frequency
metrology in performing radio surveys for
mobile network testing. The units of measurement result in a standard, meaningful
measurement of mobile network element performance and impact the radio link analysis
between subscriber device and cell sites.
The photonic backhaul link between the
mobile network cell site and the mobile network core is similarly subjected to link integrity quantification.
Location determination technologies utilized by mobile network operators to geolocate a subscriber device, the algorithms for
which utilize a variety of measurements, offer another example of how the science of
metrology influences forensic cell site analysis outcomes.
Standardized measurement units are critical to experimental and theoretical determic 2019 ADFSL
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nations. Metrology establishes a standard
measurement basis for discussion of analysis
outcomes and resulting opinions.
From the evaluation of communications
session metadata to radio frequencies in use
during communications, time and frequency
metrology plays a primary role in forensic
cell site analysis.
The airgap between mobile network subscriber device and cell site consists of less
than 5% of the path to the mobile network core. The measurement of various
radio signal parameters and the associated
formulae for determining cell site coverage,
quality of service, handoff, and likelihood
of service outages are critical to determining analysis outcomes and the formation of
expert opinions. Examples include use of
several formula models including Okumura–
Hata Model, COST 231–Walfisch–Ikegami
Model, COST 207 GSM Model, ITU-R Models, 3GPP Spatial Channel Model, ITUAdvanced Channel Model, and 802.15.4a
UWB Channel Model to determine pathloss
.
Dimensional Metrology is the science of
using measurement equipment to quantify
the distance from an object. Examples of the
use of measurement equipment in forensic
cell site analysis illustrate this usage.
Subscriber device location quantification in
forensic cell site analysis is dependent upon
location determination technology ranging
from highly accurate, finite location determination to wide-ranging, general location
determination.
Radio surveys of the network segments under analysis, utilizing radio survey methodologies including idle mode and dynamic mode,
and specific location, cell, and wide area mapping utilize precise dimensional metrology to
determine handoff zones, sector coverage limits, and mobile network void coverage boundaries.
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Optical metrology is the science and technology of measurements with photons. In
forensic cell site analysis 95% of the communications linkage between subscriber device
and mobile switching core is composed of photonic links. Understanding the measurement
unit and normal link loss over segments of
the photonic networks employed to transport
communications sessions for a subscriber device on the mobile network is essential to
calculating probabilities of network latency
issues that may cause dropped calls, out of
sequence text messaging, and other irregularities in communications sessions.
Metrology assists decision making in the
analytical process by quantifying measurements and depending on type I (false positive) and type II (false negative) error rate
determination.
Systematic errors usually originate within
test and measurement instruments and occur
due to instrument malfunction or improper
use. Random errors occur by unknown and often unpredictable factors such as atmospheric
conditions or morphologies introducing reflection, refraction or absorption of radio signals.

2.7

Computer Science

Computer science is fundamental to how the
network elements that comprise the mobile
network function and how accurately the
MNO/MVNO subscriber device activities are
logged to eventually become evidence in criminal or civil litigation. A thorough understanding of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, addressing schemes,
composition of the Internet including network
elements, switched packet flow, and routing
protocols is essential to understanding both
computer and photonic sciences. An understanding of peering, transit and service level
agreements enhances understanding and lucidity regarding potential pathing issues that
sometimes result in communications session
sequencing irregularities.
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2.8

MNO/MVNO
Charging/Billing
Architecture

Mobile network subscriber activity records
are created during the usage of a subscriber
device, while registered to the MNO/MVNO
infrastructure and during communications
sessions transporting voice calls, SMS text
messages and data usage. Multiple mobile
network elements, including Home Location
Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register
(VLR), Charging Gateway Function (CGF),
and Policy and Charging Rules Function
(PCRF) are tasked with documenting device
usage and sending the activity records to a
Billing/Charging Gateway and subsequently
on to the Billing Domain, thereby creating
records that become the basis of customer
billing.
Charging Data Records, known as Call
Detail Records (CDRs), are subscriber communications activity records produced from
the billing information database and are typically considered to be higher accuracy accounts of device usage than a cell phone bill,
e.g. metadata time stamp accuracy to the
second rather than rounded to the minute,
etc.
The functional output of the charging/billing architecture has remained fundamentally the same during the evolution from 2G
to 5G. The result has been highly accurate
recordkeeping of subscriber activities during
communications sessions, absent any errors
in recordkeeping resulting from network documentation or functionality issues, network or
billing domain configuration errors, or data
storage failures.
A logical diagram of 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G architecture including an overview of the basic
network elements and reference connectivity
to the billing domain elucidates the concept
that mobile networks are complex systems.
These systems require significant knowledge
c 2019 ADFSL
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by analysts of the differences and complexities within each network generation.
The CDRs are extracted from larger
database systems within the mobile network charging/billing infrastructure. The
integrity of evidence extracted from this data
repository is dependent upon the extraction
methodology employed by mobile network
legal production personnel and the handling
of the evidence post extraction. Mobile
network records custodians do not produce
any chain of custody documentation, however, in many instances the records custodian
prepares a notarized certification of records,
indicating, for example, that “such records
were kept in the course of regularly conducted
business activity”, that “the business activity
made such records as a regular practice” and
that “if such record is not the original, such
record is a duplicate of the original”. Typically, the certification letter lists the phone
number(s) and start and end dates of records
produced without listing, by name or other
means, the digital evidence items accompanying the certification.
Various other records are also maintained
by various MNO/MVNO departments including billing records, network maintenance logs,
real time and near real-time subscriber device location tracking logs, cell site database
records that include technical data about
each access point in the mobile network, configuration data regarding how the mobile network is configured, mobile network radio survey or drive test data, key performance indicator data that exhibits the coverage and
health of the mobile network and other technical information about subscriber activities
or network conditions. All records, apart
from handwritten logs from physical cell site
access, of maintenance, upgrade and repair
personnel, are digital in origin and should be
considered digital evidence when produced
in court as evidence.
c 2019 ADFSL
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In the digital forensic science discipline,
digital evidence obtained from sources including computer hard drive evidence and mobile
device (cell phone), is preserved using a chain
of custody methodology and must be proven
identifiable as true to the original evidence
produced to avoid preclusion by the courts.
Digital evidence integrity is assured with verification of metadata creation and modification date/time preservation along with verification function cryptographic checksum hashing of each digital evidence item.
The International Organization of Standards (ISO) and the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) have published standards
for the acquisition, preservation and handling
of digital evidence, including the establishment of chain of custody and evidence verification function. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International have published
extensive forensic evidence guidance and standards documents for the acquisition, validation and analysis of computer and cell phone
evidence. Curiously absent are standards for
the handling, validation or error mitigation
of CDR/CSLI evidence in any of the aforementioned standards bodies.
A method of validating cellular carrier
records for forensic cell site analysis is defined
in United States Patent US9113307 (Minor,
2015). Research has demonstrated that a
method for validation and error mitigation
of MNO/MVNO evidence should be utilized
to accurately complete a forensic cell site
analysis (Minor, 2017). As a prefatory to
performing validation and error mitigation
of a forensic cell site analysis, an examination of the condition of the MNO/MVNO
evidence is an important step that should be
performed prior to proceeding with analysis,
validation and error mitigation steps.
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Figure 1. 2G-3G-4G-5G Mobile Network / Charging/Billing Architecture

2.9

Mobile Network Toll &
Call Data Records Are a
Computer Driven Process

The basis for all mobile network CDRs is the
toll or billing record database sourced from
the MNO/MVNO charging/billing system.
The CDR is the primary subscriber record
produced for criminal and civil cases.
Page 66

Other records are produced by
MNO/MVNO include a variety of logs,
technical configuration data for segments
of the mobile network, test data from radio
survey results, and billing records.
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2.10

Charging and Billing
System

The MNO/MVNO charging/billing system necessarily maintains careful accounting of subscriber communications activities. The charging/billing system of each
MNO/MVNO is operated according to standards established by a variety of organizations, including national and international
bodies.
Charging Data Records, commonly known
as Call Detail Records (CDRs) are maintained and produced from a standards based
data flow to the Charging Gateway Function and into the CDR database in a format
established by standards.

2.11

JDFSL V14N2

other important information is maintained,
according to this standard. (ETSI, 2016)
The following table, from chapter 6, provides
the data repository record layout for CDR
data:

3GPP/ETSI Standards

One of the applicable standards related
to billing and charging functionality, for example, are specified within 3GPP TS 32.299
V12.6.0 (2014-10)(ETSI, 2014) 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Service and System Aspects;
Telecommunication management; Charging
management; Diameter charging applications
(Release 8). These standards among others
are followed by MNO/MVNO in the United
States and virtually all other MNO/MVNO.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) – European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) TS 32.297 v13.2.0
(2016-06) standard addresses Charging management; Charging Data Record (CDR) file
format and transfer, thereby clearly demonstrating that MNO/MVNO records are digital evidence.
In Chapter 6 of TS 32.297 v13.2.0, CDR
file format specification, 6.1.1.0, General, the
exact format of the CDR file header is given
in table 6.1.1.1. This record keeping format
is indicative of entirely digital content. Note
that timestamps, file sequence numbers and
c 2019 ADFSL

Table 6.1.1.0.1: Format of CDR file header
(p.21)
CDRs are addressed extensively in the file
header and a variety of key indicators of the
digital nature of this record keeping activity
includes timestamp metadata, record numbers, file sequence numbers, record extension information and IP addressing of the
node generating the CDR file. The specification concisely addresses how information is
recorded and integrity is maintained.
Metadata timestamps include when a CDR
file was opened, the local time differential offset from Universal Coordinated Time (UTC),
append and closure times.
Information integrity is addressed in this
format standard including number of CDRs
in a file, file sequence numbers, file closure
triggering and reasons for closure.
Finally, the specification provides for the
IP address of the Charging Gateway Function creating the CDR file and a Lost CDR
Indicator providing traceability of any error
conditions detected.
The specification continues below (p.22):
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6.1.1.5 File opening timestamp These
parameters indicate the time when the file
was opened, according to the following binary
format:
- The first four binary bits indicate the month
(1 .. 12), according to the CGF’s(ETSI, 2005)
local time zone;
- The next five binary bits contain the date
(1 :: 31), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next five binary bits contain the hour
(0 .. 23), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next six binary bits contain the minute
(0 .. 59), according to the CGF’s local time
zone;
- The next bit indicates the sign of the local
time differential from UTC (bit set to “1”
expresses ”+” or bit set to ”0” expresses ”-”
time deviation), in case the time differential
to UTC is 0 then the sign may be arbitrarily
set to ”+” or ”-”;
- The next five binary bits contain the hour
(0 .. 23) deviation of the local time towards
UTC, according to the CGF’s local time zone;
- The next six binary bits contain the minute
(0 .. 59) deviation of the local time towards
UTC, according to the CGF’s local time zone;
Note that the CDR file name contains detailed date and time information related to
file closure (see clause 6.2)
6.1.1.6 Last CDR append timestamp
This parameter is formatted the same as in
clause 6.1.1.5, and indicates the time when
the last CDR was appended to the file in
UTC format. In case of an empty file (i.e. no
CDRs included), the value of the parameter
is ”0”.
6.1.1.7 Number of CDRs in file This
parameter contains a binary value that specifies the total number of CDRs that are included in the file.
The value with all bits set to “1” is reserved
for future extensions (e.g. for CDR files conPage 68
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taining more CDRs than represented by that
value) and shall therefore not be used.
6.1.1.8 File sequence number This parameter is a value in binary that contains a
running number of the CDR file generated
by the same CGF. The first file of a CGF is
indicated by the value ”0”. When the maximum number of file is reached (all bits set
to “1”), the sequence shall be restarted with
”0”.
6.1.1.9 File closure trigger reason The
file closure reason provides a means to determine the reason that the file was closed by
the CGF. It is encoded as a single octet as
follows:
Normal closure reasons (Binary values 0 to
127):
0 = Normal closure (Undefined normal closure reason).
1 = File size limit reached (OAM&P configured).
2 = File open-time limit reached (OAM&P
configured).
3 = Maximum number of CDRs in file
reached (OAM&P configured).
4 = File closed by manual intervention.
5 = CDR release, version or encoding change.
6 to 127 are reserved for future use.
Abnormal closure reasons (Binary values 128
to 255):
128 = Abnormal file closure (Undefined error
closure reason).
129 = File system error.
130 = File system storage exhausted.
131 = File integrity error.
132 to 255 are reserved for future use.
6.1.1.10 Node IP address This parameter indicates the IP address of the CGF
generating the file. For both IPv4 and IPv6
CGF addresses, the parameter is encoded
in IPv6 representation. The first four bytes
of the parameter, which are [preceding] this
IPv6 address, are insignificant, e.g. filled
with ’FF’.
c 2019 ADFSL
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6.1.1.11 Lost CDR indicator This parameter indicates if and how many CDRs
were lost during their processing in the CGF
(see clause 5.1.1). The term ”lost” implies
that the CDR(s) could not be placed into the
destination file due to irrecoverable errors.
Due to the possibility that the irrecoverable
CDR errors may have impacted CDR parameters that are relevant for CDR routeing, it
is possible that the CGF cannot determine
for a particular file whether CDRs have been
lost. Appropriate indication shall be given
according to the following encoding of the
”lost CDR indicator”.
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits “0”: no CDRs
have been lost;
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits set to a value
corresponding to decimal 1 to decimal 126:
CGF has identified that a number of CDRs
corresponding to the value of the lower 7 bits
were lost, while it is unknown whether more
CDRs were lost;
- MSB bit “0”, all other bits set to “1”: CGF
has identified that 127 or more CDRs were
lost, while it is unknown whether more CDRs
were lost;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits “0”: CDRs
have been lost but CGF cannot determine
the number of lost CDRs;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits set to a value
corresponding to decimal 1 to decimal 126:
CGF has calculated the number of lost CDRs
as indicated in the value of the lower 7 bits;
- MSB bit “1”, all other bits set to “1”: CGF
has calculated the number of lost CDRs to
be 127 or more.” (ETSI, 2016)

2.12 Digital Evidence
Integrity Maintenance
Standards
ISO (The International Organization for
Standardization) and IEC (The International
Electrotechnical Commission) form the spec 2019 ADFSL
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cialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of
ISO or IEC participate in the development
of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective
organization to deal with specific fields of
technical activity. (ISO, 2012)
ISO 27037, Section 5.4, titled “Digital evidence handling processes”, Section 6 titled
“Key components of identification, collection,
acquisition and preservation of digital evidence”, and Section 6.1, titled “Chain of custody” (ibid), address the global standards
for digital evidence handling including collection, acquisition, preservation and chain of
custody.
The introduction to ISO 27037 states in
part . . . “These processes are required in
an investigation that is designed to maintain the integrity of the digital evidence – an
acceptable methodology in obtaining digital
evidence that will contribute to its admissibility in legal and disciplinary actions as well as
other required instances. This International
Standard also provides general guidelines for
the collection of non-digital evidence that
may be helpful in the analysis stage of the
potential digital evidence.”
The standard continues with the following statement: “This International Standard
also intends to inform decision-makers who
need to determine the reliability of digital
evidence presented to them. It is applicable
to organizations needing to protect, analyze
and present potential digital evidence.” . . . ”
Due to the fragility of digital evidence, it is
necessary to carry out an acceptable methodology to ensure the integrity and authenticity
of the potential digital evidence.”
Under Section 1, Scope, the standard delineates applicable devices as ” . . . devices
and/or functions that are used in various
circumstances:
— Digital storage media used in standard computers like hard drives, floppy disks, optical
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and magneto optical disks, data devices with
similar functions,
— Mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs), Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs),
memory cards,
— Mobile navigation systems,
— Digital still and video cameras (including
CCTV),
— Standard computer with network connections,
— Networks based on TCP/IP and other digital protocols, and
— Devices with similar functions as above.”
MNO/MVNO networks are a composite of
several of the listed devices including “networks based on TCP/IP and other digital
protocols”, “digital storage media used in
standard computers”, “mobile navigation systems”, “mobile phones, personal digital assistants”, “standard computer with network
connection”, and “devices with similar functions as above”.
Under Section 3, Terms and Definitions,
several definitions were found to be relevant
to this analysis, including:
“3.1 acquisition
process of creating a copy of data within a
defined set Note 1 to entry: The product of
an acquisition is a potential digital evidence
copy.”
“3.5 digital evidence
information or data, stored or transmitted
in binary form that may be relied on as evidence”
“3.6 digital evidence copy
copy of the digital evidence that has been
produced to maintain the reliability of the evidence by including both the digital evidence
and verification means where the method of
verifying it can be either embedded in or independent from the tools used in doing the
verification”
“3.1 preservation
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process to maintain and safeguard the integrity and/or original condition of the potential digital evidence”
“3.19 spoliation
act of making or allowing change(s) to the
potential digital evidence that diminishes its
evidential value”
“3.22 timestamp
time variant parameter which denotes a point
in time with respect to a common time reference
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:1996]”
“3.25 verification function
function which is used to verify that two sets
of data are identical
Note 1 to entry: No two non-identical data
sets should produce an identical match from
a verification function.
Note 2 to entry: Verification functions are
commonly implemented using hash functions
such as MD5, SHA1, etc., but other methods
may be used.”
ASTM International establishes that “confidence in digital and multimedia evidence
forensic results is best achieved by using an
error mitigation analysis approach that focuses on recognizing potential sources of error
and then applying techniques used to mitigate them, including trained and competent
personnel using tested and validated methods
and practices”. (ASTM, 2018)
All MNO/MVNO networks are pervasively
integrated into the network of networks commonly called the Internet. Voice, text and
data communications over the cellular network traverse the Internet from cell sites to
MNO/MVNO network core (Cisco, 2011).
The Scientific Working Group on Digital
Evidence (SWGDE) discipline guidance in
Recommendations for Cell Site Analysis confirms that “if use of the records [CDRs] in
court is anticipated, it is important to prepare to meet any applicable rules of evidence
requirements”. (SWGDE, 2017)
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The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) provides guidance and standardization for handling digital evidence in RFC
3227. The standard states in part “. . . you
should consider generating checksums and
cryptographically signing the collected evidence, as this may make it easier to preserve
a strong chain of evidence. In doing so you
must not alter the evidence.” (IETF, 2002)
The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), in the publication “Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics”
(NIST, 2007), verifies that all digital evidence
must be handled using an appropriate chain
of custody and a forensic hash validation of
the evidence. NIST defines each of the procedures as follows:
• “Forensic Hash Validation: A forensic
hash is used to maintain the integrity of
an acquisition by computing a cryptographically strong, non-reversible value
over the acquired data. After acquisition,
any changes made to the data may be detected, since a new hash value computed
over the data will be inconsistent with
the old value. For non-forensic tools,
hash values should be created using a
tool such as sha1sum and retained for integrity verification. Even tools labelled
as forensic tools may not compute a cryptographic hash, and (in these cases an
integrity hash should be computed separately).”
• “Chain of Custody – A process that
tracks the movement of evidence through
its collection, safeguarding, and analysis lifecycle by documenting each person
who handled the evidence, the date/time
it was collected or transferred, and the
purpose for any transfers.”
The Forensic Hash Validation is an integral
part of the scientific digital forensics step
process.
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The verification function mentioned in ISO
27037 is best performed by comparing two
digital evidence artifacts using a forensic hash
validation.

2.13

Role of Metadata Date &
Time

An important method of determining if
digital evidence is spoliated is to analyze
metadata creation and modification times
and authorship of digital evidence artifacts.
Documents such as Microsoft Word, Excel
Spreadsheets or Adobe PDF’s can also be analyzed for content creation and modification
metadata, including authorship to further
enhance the accuracy of digital evidence spoliation analysis.
Metadata creation and modification dates/times should be identical if copies of digital
evidence have not been tainted. Absence of
this information is an important positive indicator of spoliation, absent the presence of
verification function hash values.
NIST publication “Guide To Integrating
Forensic Techniques Into Incident Response”
describes external file metadata as follows
- File Modification, Access and Creation
Times.
It is often important to know when a file
was created, used, or manipulated, and most
OSs keep track of certain timestamps related
to files. The most commonly used timestamps are the modification, access, and creation (MAC) times, as follows:
• Modification Time. This is the last time
a file was changed in any way, including
when a file is written to and when it is
changed by another program.
• Access Time. This is the last time
any access was performed on a file (e.g.,
viewed, opened, printed).
• Creation Time. This is generally the
time and date the file was created; howPage 71
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ever, when a file is copied to a system,
the creation time will become the time
the file was copied to the new system.
The modification time will remain intact.

A method of validating cellular carrier
records accuracy for forensic cell site analysis
is defined in United States Patent US9113307.
The process includes a multi-part test to validate CDR/CSLI records and an analysis error
Different types of filesystem may store differ- mitigation methodology.
ent types of times. For example, Windows
At least one MNO/MVNO has concluded
systems retain the last modified time, the last
that this evidence is digital evidence and
access time, and the creation time of files. . . ” should be treated as such. In 2013, AT&T
(NIST, 2006)
Mobility acquired Cricket Wireless, a prepaid
mobile network provider (Mobile Virtual Net2.14 Error Rates
work Operator or MVNO). Cricket Wireless
MNO/MVNO have documented error rates
uses the AT&T infrastructure to process comin subscriber activity records that, to date, munications for its subscribers and the
have not been publicly disclosed. Research
AT&T Mobility charging/billing system
performed during validation and error mitprovides usage records to Cricket Wireless.
igation testing on over 300,000 pages of
Cricket produces CDR/CSLI evidence for its
MNO/MVNO produced evidence realized ersubscribers in response to legal requests and
ror rates that approach 2% in some cases
offers the following disclaimer when digital
(Minor, 2017).
copies of CDR/CSLI evidence is produced
The previously mentioned 3GPP/ETSI TS
and emailed to a requesting party:
32.297 standard, Section 6.1.1.11 Lost CDR
“At the request of the law enforceindicator, mentions error rates; however, in
ment agency receiving the following
hundreds of cases analyzed, and many cases
Subpoena Compliance information,
in which a MNO/MVNO employee testified,
Cricket Communications (”Cricket”)
none has ever disclosed any error rate inforprovides the following information
mation. The standard states in part ”This
electronically in a searchable, manipparameter indicates if and how many CDRs
ulable form. Although Cricket veriwere lost during their processing in the CGF
fies the authenticity of the informa(see clause 5.1.1). The term ”lost” implies
tion attached to this e-mail as sent,
that the CDR(s) could not be placed into the
Cricket cannot and will not testify to
destination file due to irrecoverable errors.”
the authenticity of this information
Studies performed on the Movistar - Teleafter it is received by the recipient
fonica Chile Mobile Network Operations relaw enforcement agency. This is besulted in creation of a methodology to analyse
cause the attached information electime accuracy in post-mediation (postpaid
tronically sent by Cricket is manipubilling) CDRs (Peredo, 2017). In this study,
lable.” (Pennsylvania Superior Court, 2016)
recorded CDR events were compared with
actual logging events using a network event
measurement tool. Although the analysis
3. RESEARCH
results were inconclusive, the methodology
exhibits promise that more accurate error
METHODOLOGY
models for the CDR record keeping function
are arriving and that error rates are quantifi- The analysis was performed in four phases as
follows:
able.
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3.1

Phase I

A four-part test was applied to first determine if MNO/MVNO subscriber activity
records should be subjected to digital evidence handling and analysis standards as
follows:
• Is MNO/MVNO subscriber communications activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process?
• Are subscriber communications activity
records, extracted for litigation purposes,
digital evidence?
• Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards?
• Do the same rules for spoliation determination apply to this type of evidence?

3.2

Phase II

The control group of MNO/MVNO digital evidence was reviewed for the presence of
any chain of custody documents. Note that
any certification letters provided by records
custodians do not list evidence items by document name, number or other confirmable
identifier.

3.3

This portion of the analysis was documented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “last printed date”
metadata including date and author.
This portion of the analysis was documented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Externally, any valid original creation
date metadata for each digital evidence
item. This portion of the analysis was
documented under the External File
Metadata categorization. (NIST, 2006)
• Externally, any valid original modification date metadata for each digital evidence item. This portion of the analysis
was documented under the External File
Metadata categorization.

3.4

Phase IV

Finally, a verification function analysis was
performed to determine that the copy of the
evidence is identical to the evidence produced
by the MNO/MVNO custodian of records in
the following manner:

Phase III

The MNO/MVNO CDR evidence was then
subjected to a five-part metadata analysis
using the following protocol:
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “creation date”
metadata including date and author.
This portion of the analysis was documented under the Internal Document
Metadata categorization.
• Internally within each digital evidence
item, any document “modification date”
metadata including date and author.
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• Each evidence item was scrutinized for
a verification function cryptographic
checksum hash value. A cryptographic
checksum hash value should have been
calculated on the original and any copy
of the evidence item.
• If a verification function cryptographic
hash value was found, then a cryptographic hash value was calculated for
the produced evidence item for the purpose of comparison and final verification
that the original evidence item and the
evidence item produced are identical.
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Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet database
software product, was utilized to document
the chain of custody analysis, metadata analysis, verification function analysis outlined
above and document the presence or absence
of spoliation. All information in the matrix
is independently verifiable.

4.

OUTCOMES

4.1 Phase I - Business
Records – The Question of
Digital Evidence
Are Mobile Network Records Produced as
Evidence Actually Digital Evidence?
Analysis of MNO/MVNO CDR evidence
was undertaken from the research control
group of cases to determine if each evidence
artifact should be classified as digital evidence by applying the devised four-part test.
All evidence items tested positive as digital
evidence.
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase I:
1. Is MNO/MVNO subscriber communications activity record keeping a computer
driven digital process? Yes, standards
for digital record keeping methods and
formats clearly affirm this question.
2. Are MNO/MVNO subscriber communications activity records, extracted for
litigation purposes, classified as digital
evidence? Yes, the records are created
digitally by computing-based methods
and the extracted reports produced are
digital evidence and, thus, are purely
digital from inception to production.
3. Is this type of evidence subject to digital
evidence handling standards? Yes, all
digital evidence is subject to the same
evidence handling standards.
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4. Do the same rules for evidence spoliation determination apply to this type
of evidence? Yes, no exceptions to the
standards are addressed.

4.2

Phase II - Chain of
Custody Issue

No chain of custody documentation accompanied any of the evidence. Chain of custody
documentation should have been created and
forwarded with the CDR evidence from the
MNO/MVNO legal department/custodian of
records and all others conveying the evidence.
The Custodian of Records certification letters were present in many cases. When such
documents were present, the certifications
did not describe or specify which files, documents or other digital evidence were being
provided, by file name, traceable number or
any other recognizable, traceable or accountable method.
The following outcomes were observed for
Phase II:
None of the digital evidence items were
accompanied by chain of custody documentation.

4.3

Phase III - Evidence
Condition Observations
and Findings

A spoliation analysis of the MNO/MVNO
CDR evidence produced the following results:
1. Observation: MNO/MVNO CDR evidence within the control group was produced in a variety of digital formats
including Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
file, comma-separated values (CSV) file
(IETF, 2005) (typically opened automatically by Excel), plain text file, Rich Text
File (RTF) file, Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) file, Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) file, and
Microsoft Word Document file.
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Figure 2. Outcomes Summary
2. Observation: MNOs/MVNOs began to
offer degraded evidence production as
pressure to respond to escalating demand during recent years. Observed
manifestations were typically either removal of all creation/modification metadata, creation of documents using methods that produce no creation/modification metadata, multiple employee (author) creation/modification metadata,
or removal of employee (author) metadata combined with differing creation
and modification metadata. Examples of
appropriate creation/modification metadata were rarely found within the control
group.
Figure 4. MNO evidence item example internal metadata with proper artifact integrity

idence when multiple authors are discovered
during analysis of metadata.

Figure 3. MNO evidence item example indicating appropriate evidence creation and
handling
Examples of tainted evidence is indicated
in significant percentages of MNO/MVNO evc 2019 ADFSL

1. Observation: MNO/MVNO CDR production formats vary widely in content
and arrangement of data. Contrary to
guidance provided in SWGDE Cell Site
Analysis that states that “Even if CDRs
are provided, which include specific latitude and longitude references to the
antennas used by a target device, it is
necessary to have the neighboring cell
site locations and information to conduct CSA more thoroughly”, production
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Figure 5. MNO evidence item example presenting multiple authors with no metadata
date changes. The Last Modified by author is
consistent with changes by a different author
from some MNOs/MVNOs do not provide neighboring cell site locations.
2. The National Domestic Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC,
2018) is provided extensive support by
MNOs/MVNOs, specifically supplying
lists of cell sites with technical configurations for each site to NDCAC. A
request to NDCAC for access to the
cell site database receives an access denial from NDCAC personnel with the
message “Users who access our systems
must acknowledge and attest they are
an employee of a law enforcement or
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Figure 6. MNO evidence item example presenting multiple authors and disparate creation and modification dates metadata evidence taint

criminal justice agency, in good standing and are accessing this U.S. Government system for official use only”. Until
MNOs/MVNOs provide the information
produced in a data repository that is accessible to all stakeholders / practitioners, or, an acceptance of MNO/MVNO
evidence as digital evidence transpires,
performing any verification of authenticity or validation of the condition of this
category of evidence will continue to be
a challenge.

The following outcomes were observed for
Phase III:
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from the control group is from more recent cases.

5. External file metadata for last modified
date was found to be tainted in 37.79%
of the evidence.

6. Overall, excluding the tests for chain of
custody and verification function hash
value presence, 74.07% of evidence reviewed from the control group were
found to be tainted.

Figure 7. Results of the Phase III Analysis
1. Analysis of the internal file metadata
present within the evidence revealed that
only 0.41% of the internal metadata creation dates had been altered.

7. Evidence taint was introduced either carelessly or nefariously by
MNO/MVNO employees, law enforcement investigators, attorney staff
or others involved in handling and
conveyance of evidence.

2. Various authorship was indicated in
internal file creation and modification
metadata in 10.9% of the control group
analysis.

8. 100% of the evidence was found to have
no chain of custody documentation.

3. The last modified date, according to
internal file metadata, was not consistent with pristine evidence condition in
23.17% of the evidence.

9. 100% of the evidence was found to have
no calculated verification function cryptographic checksum hash values.

4. 20.14% of the evidence was found to
have been scrubbed of internal file metadata creation / modification information,
thus rendering the evidence subject to
undetectable, inappropriate alteration.
The most commonly observed evidence
with such missing metadata was Comma
Separated Values or CSV data, a method
of saving spreadsheet files, commonly
used to eradicate any indications of authorship or metadata creation/modification information. CSV format evidence
c 2019 ADFSL

4.4

Phase IV – Verification
Function Calculated Hash
Value Analysis

The following outcomes were observed for
Phase IV:
None of the digital evidence items were accompanied by a cryptographically calculated
verification function checksum hash value.
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Figure 8. Evidence Spoliation/Taint was Discovered Throughout the Stakeholder Spectrum

5. EVIDENCE
INTEGRITY
MAINTENANCE
SOLUTIONS

MNO/MVNO evidence production is
clearly a process lacking uniformity between
operators, varying widely in internal evidence
extraction techniques. Format and content
of evidence production also varies widely.

MNOs/MVNOs do not currently utilize a
mechanism to properly preserve the integrity
of evidence produced in criminal or civil case
requests. Research into multiple existing or
emerging chain of custody/verification function technologies resulted in potential solutions to the evidence integrity maintenance
challenge.

Standards are non-existent for uniform
MNO/MVNO evidence extraction, format,
integrity assurance or delivery methods. The
widespread use of this type of evidence in
criminal and civil cases necessitates an urgent need for evidence production and management protocols that incorporate chain of
custody, verification function hash value generation and maintenance of evidence integrity
assurance, none of which are currently utilized by MNO/MVNO nor other digital platforms such as social network, search engine,
or other digital service providers during evidence production.

5.1

Background and
Incentives

Key incentives for MNO/MVNO adoption of
a solution are likely to be the following:
• Ease of integrating a solution into existing charging/billing architectures.
• Judicious Capitalization (CAPEX) and
Operating (OPEX) Expenses.
• Timeliness and performance speed of evidence integrity preservation processing.
• Ability for the solution to be assimilated
by each successive generation of the mobile network.
Numerous proven and patented methods for
evidence integrity maintenance currently exist and this paper explores one such solution.
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This research project undertook development of a simplified solution to MNO/MVNO
evidence production protocols that would provide a relatively low cost, state of the art
evidence integrity assurance mechanism that
meets basic digital evidence handling standards. MNO/MVNO operations are complex,
ultra-busy environs with an exponential rise
in communications volume and evidence production expected in the coming years, consequently any solution would necessarily be
efficient and effective.
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5.2 Distributed Ledger
Technology/Block-chain
Research
Block-chain/Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT)(Gramoli, 2018) offers a promising solution to digital document authentication and
verification. Block-chain paradigms such as
Bitcoin and other open source technologies,
e.g. Openchain (Openchain, 2019), provide
for a distributed ledger-based chain of custody and verification function checksum hash
value generation for each evidence artifact, enabling an analyst to verify evidence integrity.
Numerous service providers currently offer
document authentication and verification services that utilize Block-chain/DLT protocols.
Incorporating a built-in Block-chain/DLT
client during the evidence production process
would eliminate the evidence spoliation/taint
issues discovered during this research project
and would introduce readily validated evidence that is synonymous with digital evidence in all other digital forensics disciplines.
Block-chain/DLT provides key elements of a
functional architecture that ensure validity
and integrity of digital evidence.
Fundamental DLT Architecture
The architecture of Distributed Ledger Technology is articulated in several elements.
(Gramoli, 2018)
The Consensus Element (p.19) is a fundamental function of a Block-chain providing a
“distributed voting process”. Protocols that
are both scalable and secure will be required
to accommodate the rapidly growing world
of MNO/MVNO evidence production.
The Security Element (p.20) is critical to
authentication and integrity, providing malicious user protections.
The Validation Element (p.20) is the asymmetric cryptographic system used to create
necessary public and private key pairs, using technologies currently available including
c 2019 ADFSL
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (IETF,
2011) algorithms. Despite security
concerns regarding early ECC algorithms
adopted by NIST (NIST, 2000) almost 20
years ago, more current ECC including Curve
25519 (IETF, 2016) offer security levels with
exponentiated Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) protections.
The Ownership Element (Gramoli, p. 20)
enables transfer of evidence copy while ensuring authenticity and integrity. DLT transaction language offers the opportunity for such
transfer of digital assets between accounts
while maintaining evidence integrity.
All entities requesting evidence production
from an MNO/MVNO would be dealt with
uniformly as follows:
1. As evidence extraction from the
MNO/MVNO
occurs
a
Blockchain/DLT process is incorporated
during evidence production to create
a chain of custody and a public key is
utilized to encrypt each evidence item.
2. Using Block-chaining transaction techniques during the encryption process, a
ledger-based chain of custody and verification function hash value calculation is
automatically created.
3. Each evidence artifact is transmitted to
an evidence portal to be accessed by
the evidence requesting entity. Evidence
items are decrypted by authorized parties, producing a chain of custody resulting in self-auditing evidence artifacts.
4. An evidence integrity checking mechanism is integrated into the same portal,
resulting in the ability for anyone who
has access to the evidence to determine
the condition of the evidence.
To validate the effectiveness of the
use of Block-chain/DLT protocols with
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Figure 9. Comparison of Bitcoin Financial Transaction and MNO/MVNO Evidence Transaction Paradigms

Figure 10. Data Flow for the MNO/MVNO Compliance Center Evidence Production with
Built-in Distributed Ledger
MNO/MVNO evidence, an experiment was
conducted using MNO/MVNO produced evidence to authenticate and provide condition
verification services for each evidence item.
The experiment consisted of several steps
as follows:
1. Creation of a user ID on the website of a
provider offering DLT digital document
authentication and verification services.
2. Two MNO/MVNO evidence items were
then processed into the portal. The time
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to perform an intake varied from 15-45
seconds (processing time is primarily related to digital file size and Internet access bandwidth). Processing timeliness
may be a critical function for MNOs as
the volume of evidence requests soars.

3. The evidence artifacts were then digitally signed, creating the digital ledgerbased chain of custody documentation
required.
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Figure 11. Example test Block-chain processing of MNO/MVNO evidence
4. The intake, verification function hash
value calculation and signature process
required a total of 1-2 minutes to perform for each evidence artifact. The
final step in this process, notarization,
required a short pause for verification of
steps 1-3.
5. At this stage in the process the evidnce receipt is available, and the evidence
item is available to download by the requesting party.
c 2019 ADFSL

Block-chain/DLT research (Bonomi 2018)
(Lone 2019) has produced similar methods for
evidence processing, demonstrating that at
least conceptually, this is a potential solution
that MNOs/MVNOs, and tech giants such
as Facebook, Google and other technology
platforms could readily integrate to introduce
an evidence integrity maintenance process to
legal records production as evidence.
Alternative solutions to the evidence
integrity maintenance conundrum for
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MNOs/MVNOs include the use of a digital
certificate, by ”[i]nserting the certification into the file”, research of which has
demonstrated, “is the only apparent reliable
method and is the approach used by leading
companies such as Microsoft and Adobe for
digital signing of Office and PDF documents”
(Curran 2017) offer potential resolution of
this issue, however may be cumbersome to
integrate.

6.

CONCLUSIONS

The MNO/MVNO evidence analyzed during this research project was determined to
be digital evidence. Subsequently, the evidence was subjected to a multi-part spoliation/taint test and examined to validate if
each digital evidence artifact was identical
to the evidence originally produced by the
MNO/MVNO records custodian.
Over 74% of the evidence was determined
to be spoliated/tainted based upon an analysis of the metadata creation/modification
dates and/or authorship for each evidence
artifact.
National and international standards for
the preservation, integrity maintenance and
handling of digital evidence were not followed
in 100% of the evidence.
Neither chain of custody documentation
nor verification function cryptographic hash
values were found to be present within any of
the evidence, further eliminating any opportunity to validate that the evidence analyzed
was an exact copy of the original evidence
produced by the MNO/MVNO.
If any evidence from the control group was
offered as digital evidence in a court proceeding it should be precluded from admission as
valid evidence based on the findings from this
research. If challenged under FRE 806 (6)(E),
absent adequate chain of custody documentation, verification function cryptographic
checksum hash calculations ensuring evidence
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integrity, and with affirmative evidence spoliation/taint indicators, such evidence should
be precluded by a court.
The use of a variety of existing methods
for maintaining the integrity of digital evidence offers an opportunity to bring much
needed integrity to MNO/MVNO evidence
production.
Use of Block-chain based DLT technology, researched and tested as an evidence
integrity maintenance solution, would permit MNO/MVNO organizations to create
chain of custody and verification function
cryptographic hash value calculations during
evidence production. The process could be
performed with minimal human interaction,
requiring no trusted third party while ensuring that evidence integrity endures during
evidence conveyance among parties.
Further performance and conformity
testing will ultimately evolve an adequately robust mechanism for preserving evidence integrity in MNO/MVNO environs.
MNOs/MVNOs work together continuously
to create global standards for the operation
and inter-operation of mobile networks worldwide. No published standards work has occurred to jointly create a uniform evidence
production format or evidence handling, integrity maintenance and conveyance protocols.
5G and future Generations of mobile networks are expected to continue to produce
increasing volumes of evidence as continuous connectivity between subscribers reaches
ubiquity and use of this evidence in criminal
and civil cases becomes ever more prolific.
MNOs/MVNOs cooperate with government and law enforcement entities necessarily
as a requirement of CALEA and other acts.
The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulates radio frequency spectrum in
the United States yet has no oversight regarding evidence produced by MNOs/MVNOs.
Determination whether evidence produced
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by MNOs/MVNOs is permissible in a courtroom as business records under FRE 803 (6)
or is required to be treated as digital evidence falls under the scope of the United
States Federal Judiciary. A persuasive argument using FRE 803 (6)(E) could result
in a judicial decision that the current practice of introducing this evidence in a court as
business records is an obsolete paradigm for
MNO/MVNO evidence acceptance by courts,
resulting in a shift in judicial precedent for
this issue. The increased use of this type of
evidence in criminal and civil cases could also
result in U.S. Congress deciding to regulate
these decisions through legislation to ensure
that constitutional rights are upheld.
Only when MNOs/MVNOs follow well established digital evidence preservation, integrity maintenance and handling protocols
will pristine evidence be found throughout
the life cycle of a civil or criminal case.
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